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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
NANCY S. HAGER, aka 
NANCY C. STALLINGS, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES RONALD HAGER, SR., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENTS 
Several times throughout her brief the Plaintiff makes 
the allegation that the Defendant refused to list the parties 
marital home as required by the Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff 
attempts to make this allegation a believable, factual conclusion. 
However, this allegation is neither factual nor an accurate 
representation of fact. Neither the parties Stipulation nor the 
Decree of Divorce place the onus of listing the former marital home 
on the Defendant. Rather, the obligation to list the home for sale 
is the clear responsibility of both parties. (Paragraph 7, Decree 
of Divorce.) The truth is that the Defendant did list the marital 
home for sale in absolute compliance with paragraph seven (7) of 
the Decree of Divorce. This listing was with Merrill Lynch Realty 
Relocation, the company utilized by the Defendant's employer to 
purchase the homes of transferred employees. The two (2) Order to 
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Show Cause proceedings initiated by the Plaintiff were little more 
than impermissible attempts to force the Defendant to act in a 
manner more closely palatable to the way she believed events should 
occur, regardless of the fact that the premises for the relief she 
was seeking were unfounded and not supported by the Decree of 
Divorce. Additionally, as has been amply demonstrated in the 
Defendant's brief, the Defendant was attempting to negotiate a sale 
of the home with the relocation company until May 4, 1989. 
The Plaintiff also makes note of several opportunities 
the Defendant may have had to either negotiate differently the 
terms of the Decree of Divorce or to file objections to the Order 
to Show Cause hearing which was held on March 27, 1989. This Court 
should be aware that the Defendant did not have counsel either 
during the negotiation of the divorce nor at the first Order to 
Show Cause hearing. The Defendant, to his detriment, relied upon 
representations made by counsel for Plaintiff when agreeing to the 
terms of the divorce. Moreover, he was unaware that he had the 
right to appeal from the ruling issued by Commissioner Peuler ca 
March 27, 1989. 
The Defendant takes issue to the statement made by the 
Plaintiff that no objections were made on October 17, 1989 to the 
fact that there was going to be no evidentiary hearing on that 
date. Objections were made. However, this issue shall be 
addressed at a later date in the Defendant's reply brief. 
The Defendant believes that any reliance upon Rule 70 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is an erroneous misapplication 
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of the Rule. As will be discussed more fully later in this brief, 
Rule 70 is applicable to the conveyances of property but not to the 
division of net sales proceeds realized from the sale of real 
property. 
DETAIL OF THE REPLY ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE IT ORDERS 
AND JUDGMENTS BY ENTERING FURTHER JUDGMENT TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC 
REMEDIES WHEN A PARTY FAILS TO COMPLY WITH PRIOR ORDERS OR 
JUDGMENTS. 
As a matter of black letter law the Defendant has no quarrel 
with the statement "The trial Court has authority to enforce its 
orders and judgments by entering further judgment to provide 
specific remedies when a party fails to comply with prior orders 
or judgments." However, this power is not absolute. Nor can the 
Court's authority be utilized to modify or alter existing judgments 
sua sponte. The Defendant takes issue with the Plaintiff's 
analysis of the statement of black letter law and the Plaintiff's 
application of the statement of black letter law to this case. A 
further discussion of the proper application of the Court's 
authority shall follow after correction of other misleading and 
erroneous statements made by the Plaintiff on pages 8 through 11 
inclusive, of the Plaintiff's brief. 
It is misleading for the Plaintiff to contend that the 
Defendant's employer purchases or did purchase the residences of 
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relocated employees for fair market value. Residences were 
purchased at prices agreed upon between the relocation company and 
the sellers. It is not necessarily true that all transactions were 
at fair market value. These parties, in the past, had rejected 
offers made by a relocation company in conjunction with other 
transfers. With reference to the home owned by the parties in Salt 
Lake County, Utah it is important to realize that the parties 
rejected the relocation company's offered sales price as it was not 
indicative of the fair market value of the home. 
It is erroneous and misleading for the Plaintiff to 
continue to insist that the listing date and sale date were 
synonymous. The Defendant has adequately explained what his 
understanding of paragraph seven (7) of the Decree of Divorce was. 
Certainly, the parties understood and agreed that they would first 
see if the employer's relocation company would purchase their home 
and real property at an agreed upon price. These parties each 
knew, from past experience, that negotiations for the purchase of 
a transferred employee's home commenced after the relocation was 
initiated. Both parties also knew that the entire process of 
listing the home with the relocation company, obtaining the 
necessary inspections, and appraisals required in excess of sixty 
(60) days1 time. 
There, however, is no absolute mandate the parties home 
had to be sold to the relocation company. This is precisely one 
of the facets of the argument presented at the Order to Show Cause 
hearing, at the short meeting with Judge Moffat, and on appeal. 
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Additionally, if the Plaintiff were totally factual in her 
representations and arguments she would realize that the Defendant 
has sought clarification of who is responsible for the mortgage 
payments after September 30, 1988. The fact that paragraph seven 
(7) of the Decree of Divorce is ambiguous is not the fault of the 
Defendant. The Defendant was without representation when the 
Stipulation and the final divorce documents were drafted. 
Plaintiff and her attorney drafted the documents. The ambiguity is 
their fault and if anyone is to be penalized by any ambiguity it 
should be Plaintiff. 
On page nine (9) of her brief the Plaintiff states 
"Defendant asserts that he did list the residence with Merrill 
Lynch Relocation Services, but there is no evidence to support his 
contention." If there had been no listing with Merrill Lynch 
Relocation Services there would have been no appraisals paid for 
by Merrill Lynch Relocation Services and certainly there would have 
been no purchase offer. This statement is so patently false it 
borders on being offensive. 
The Plaintiff maintains on page ten (10) of her brief 
that she is not a record owner of the real property and the 
Defendant is the only record owner of the residence. Defendant has 
submitted as attachments to his brief copies of the Trust Deed 
which were negotiated when the parties1 home in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, was purchased. The Trust Deed and all the closing documents 
indicate that the home was purchased jointly by the Plaintiff and 
Defendant. The Warranty Deed states the house was owned by James 
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R« Hager, Sr., a married man. The parties believed (the Defendant 
still believes) this deed evidences a joint tenancy ownership with 
his former spouse. The Defendant was not represented by counsel 
at the Order to Show Cause hearing wherein it was determined that 
the Defendant was the owner of the parties1 home. While this legal 
conclusion was not challenged by the Defendant on appeal because 
he did not realize he had the right to do so, it is currently 
disputed as the Defendant and counsel seriously doubt the finding 
is accurate. Moreover, at some future point if a listing agreement 
is executed counsel for the Defendant believes that a real estate 
broker will request and require the signatures of both the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant on any listing agreement. The fact 
that the Plaintiff later chose to file a lis pendens against the 
property only muddied the negotiations between the parties and the 
relocation company and will continue to cloud the title on this 
property thus delaying, if not precluding, conveyance to a third 
party buyer. 
The Defendant fails to understand any of the arguments 
advanced by the Plaintiff that he has ever acted in anything other 
than good faith. Of specific confusion is the argument made on 
page eleven (11) of the Plaintiff's brief that the appraisals done 
by Mr. Mulcock and Mr. Holt verify a lack of good faith by the 
Defendant in his efforts to sell the parties1 home. Certainly, 
these appraisals do state that the parties1 home was not listed for 
sale as of rhe date of the appraisals in 1988. However, the 
Plaintiff is willfully and erroneously misinterpreting these 
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statements. The home was listed for sale with the relocation 
company. The reference that the home is not listed for sale simply 
is an indication that the home is not listed with a licensed real 
estate broker conducting business in Salt Lake County, Utah nor 
does it appear that in the Salt Lake County Multi-listing 
Directory. This is not any indication that the home was not listed 
for sale and that negotiations for the actual sale of the home were 
not being conducted. 
The Plaintiff misconstrues, misapplies and convolutes 
Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Certainly, there is 
no argument that the parties were to list the home for sale. This 
is the only specific act required of the parties pursuant to 
paragraph seven (7) of Decree of Divorce. If indeed, the Court 
could conclude that the listing agreement had not been executed 
then the only option permissible to the trial court under the 
directive of Rule 70 is to empower another party, arguably the 
Plaintiff, to execute a listing agreement with a real estate broker 
licenced to do business in Salt Lake County, Utah and to empower 
the Plaintiff to effectuate the sale of the home to a bona fide 
purchaser for fair market value. Rule 70 does not empower the 
trial court to modify or amend the Decree of Divorce and convert 
the Plaintiff's speculative net equity interest into a monetary 
judgment. Both Commissioner Peuler and Judge Moffat far exceeded 
the authority of a trial court to enforce its orders and far 
exceeded the specific authority granted the trial court by Rule 70 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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The Defendant would request that this Appellant Court 
carefully consider the language of K. M. Young and Associate v. 
Cieslik, 675 P.2d 793 (Hawaii App. 1983), a case cited by the 
Plaintiff on page twelve (12) of her brief. In the afore-
referenced case the Appellate Court of Hawaii states: 
"Relief granted by a court of equity is discretionary 
and will not be overturned on review unless trial court 
abused its discretion by issuing decision that clearly 
exceeded bounds of reason or disregarded rules or 
principles of law or practice to substantial detriment 
of the appellant." 
Commissioner Peuler and Judge Moffat both clearly exceeded the 
bounds of reason and principles of law as they modified and amended 
the parties1 Decree of Divorce. The actions of the trial court are 
in clear contradiction to the rulings in Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d 
1213 (Utah 1983), Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, (UT. Ct of App., Case 
No. 880491 - CA) and Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981). 
Precisely because the trial court abused its discretion, exceeded 
the applicable bounds of statutory precedent and applicable rules 
of procedure to the detriment of the Defendant, the ruling of the 
trial court must be reversed and either a proper determination of 
the Plaintiff's net equity be made by this Court or this case 
should be remanded to the trial court with clear directives for 
proper resolution. 
There is another alternative available if this Court: 
determines that the trial court and the court of appeals should be 
bound by a proper application of Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Specifically, this Court could order the Defendant and 
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the Plaintiff to execute a listing agreement with a licensed real 
estate broker conducting business in Salt Lake County, Utah and 
order that the marital home be advertised for sale in the Salt Lake 
County Multi-listing Directory. The Defendant has no objections 
to being required to do this and would do so immediately if so 
ordered by the Court. 
There was no requirement that the Defendant convey land 
or deliver documents or deeds. Nor was there any requirement that 
the specific act required of the Defendant was to pay the Plaintiff 
the sum of eleven thousand nine hundred fifty one dollars sixty 
cents ($11,951.60) as her share of the net equity in the jointly 
owned former marital home. Absent any of these specific 
requirements, reliance upon Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to justify the judgment of the trial court, which is the 
subject of this appeal, is erroneous. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN COMPUTING PLAINTIFF'S NET 
INTEREST IN THE PARTIES' RESIDENCE. 
It is correct that no listing agreement was ever executed 
with a licensed real estate broker operating in Salt Lake County, 
Utah nor was the partiesf home ever advertised in the Salt Lake 
County Multi-listing Directory. However, to assume that this is 
the fault of the Defendant is to ignore the facts and to ignore the 
interactions between these parties. The Defendant did ask the 
Plaintiff to execute a listing agreement. The Plaintiff's 
representation to the Defendant was that she would refuse to do so 
based upon advice of counsel who had informed her that she had no 
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obligation to execute a listing agreement as she was not a record 
owner of the property. However, when the Defendant spoke with a 
local real estate broker he was informed that the listing agreement 
would have to be signed by both the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
before the home could be listed for sale and marketed. The 
Defendant should not and cannot be penalized for matters that he 
could not control. 
The Plaintiff has totally failed to address several 
issues raised by the Defendant in challenging the amount of net 
equity determined by Commissioner Peuler. It is presumed she 
agrees with those matters not refuted. The Defendant has never 
indicated a willingness to totally absorb the real estate 
commissions and any other additional costs associated with the 
eventual sale of the parties former home. Moreover, paragraph 
seven (7) of the Decree of Divorce does not require that he solely 
bear responsibility and liability for these expenses. If indeed, 
the trial court can speculate as to what is the fair market value 
of the home and can speculate as to what the Plaintiff's net equity 
interest in the home is, it certainly could deduce what would be 
one half of the statutorily allowable real estate commissions if 
the property were sold at the price determined by the court to be 
the fair market value of the property. These costs should have 
been equally borne by the parties and should have been subtracted 
from the airounts allegedly due the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff also fails to rebut the Defendant's 
contention that at a minimum there was an additional five thousand 
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six hundred dollars ($5,600.00) which should have been deducted 
from the speculative market price of the parties1 home. Both 
appraisers identified several other repairs and improvements that 
each felt would have to be done to the property before it could be 
sold. The parties, because of their past experiences with 
relocation companies, knew that additional costs and repairs 
referenced by appraisers were deducted by the relocation company 
when issuing settlement checks upon purchase of the relocated 
empoyee's property. The additional five thousand six hundred 
dollars ($5,600.00) in repairs and improvements certainly was not 
going to be eaten nor borne by the relocation company. Rather, the 
relocation company would in this instance, as it had done to 
parties in the past, deduct the costs of anticipated repairs and 
improvements. 
The trial court made absolutely no deduction for the 
known costs of additional repairs as cited by the appraisers. This 
clearly was erroneous and contrary to paragraph seven (7) of the 
Decree of Divorce. Commissioner Peuler had an opportunity to 
review all of the figures presented by the parties. She made 
errors in calculating the equity allegedly due and owing the 
Plaintiff. Counsel for the Defendant does not believe that Judge 
Moffat carefully reviewed the figures or information given to him 
by the parties. After submitting the Defendant's brief, counsel 
for the Defendant learned that Judge Moffat had issued a ruling in 
another case almost simultaneously with his blanket, rubber-stamp 
approval of Commissioner Peulerfs recommendations in this case. 
13 
It appears that Judge Moffat had two cases under advisement with 
similar names. Not only did Judge Moffat have Hager v. Hager, this 
case under consideration he also had under consideration a case 
entitled Hagen v. Hagen, Civil No. 764921378, Appeals No. 900114 -
CA. Discussions with one of the attorneys in the Hagen matter and 
a comparison of the issues in Hagen and Hager indicate that it is 
quite likely that Judge Moffat confused the two cases. This 
possible confusion was unfortunate and may have necessitated two 
appeals to this Court. 
III. DEFENDANT WAS NOT GRANTED AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
ANY IRREGULARITIES IN THE PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT WAIVED BY THE 
DEFENDANT. 
Admittedly, there is no record of the events that 
transpired in Judge Moffatfs chambers on October 17, 1989. It is 
also admitted that recollection of the events are subjective. 
However, the Defendant and his counsel have attempted to be 
extremely factual, objective and accurate in recounting the events. 
Counsel for the Defendant does not recall Judge Moffat indicating 
that there was opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to 
convening another matter which was scheduled for the morning of 
October 17, 1989. It is her recollection that there was no time 
for the evidentiary hearing and it was the Judge's indication that 
the best he could do A?as to allow the parties to make brief 
proffers of their argument prior to having to formally convene 
Court on the other matrer. There was no time to discuss what the 
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documentary evidence, which was submitted to the Court would 
verify. Nor was there time for the Defendant to produce additional 
documentation in his possession. Counsel for the parties were 
allowed a brief opportunity to summarize their positions. 
Thereafter, Judge Moffat indicated that he would take the matter 
under advisement and review the submitted documentation. 
Counsel for the Defendant did object to the fact that 
there would be no evidentiary hearing in this matter. She also 
pointed out to the Court that her client had traveled, at his 
expense, from California to attend an evidentiary hearing. It 
would be difficult for him to come back to Utah for a later hearing 
particularly when Judge Moffat could not be specific about how soon 
an evidentiary hearing could be held. Moreover, the Defendant and 
Counsel was reluctant to press very strenuously for a later 
evidentiary hearing as she and the Defendant were fearful that they 
would make an adverse impression upon the Judge who had clearly 
indicated that it was his preference and policy not to have an 
evidentiary hearing and who had clearly indicated that he had very 
little time for this matter. 
It is absolutely erroneous for the Plaintiff to conclude 
"An evidentiary hearing would not have produced more information 
for the trial court to consider and would have protracted the 
hearing without significant benefit to either party." The 
Defendant had additional documentation and significant testimony 
which he wished to present which refuted the allegations made by 
the Plaintiff that he had refused to list the home for sale, that 
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the negotiations with Merrill Lynch had concluded anytime prior to 
May 4, 1989 and that the equity calculations made by the 
Commissioner were erroneous. He also wished the Court to rule on 
the issues of the requested removal of the Plaintiff's lis pendens 
and the contractual obligations of the parties to each pay one half 
of the monthly mortgage. The absence of an evidentiary hearing and 
the probable confusion of two similarly named cases absolutely 
impacted the Defendant detrimentally. Perhaps an evidentiary 
hearing would have precluded the need for an appeal. 
The Defendant and counsel did state objections to the 
lack of an evidentiary hearing and expressed disappointment at 
Judge Moffat's explanation. This issue is not being raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
The Plaintiff and her counsel have deliberately 
misinterpreted and misconstrued a statement made by the attorney 
for the Defendant in her Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to 
Motion in Limone to Strike Hearing and to Impose Sanctions for 
Payment of Attorney's Fees, which is dated Novemoer 17, 1989. This 
statement was made in response to a completely separate matter 
which is not the subject of this appeal. The Defendant did 
question whether or not he should be granted an evidentiary 
hearing. However, being pragmatic and not wishing to upset the 
Judge on October 17, 1989 no aggressive or obnoxiously strenuous 
objection was made. Rather, a pragmatic decision was made to 
follow the clear indication of the trial judge as to what he wished 
the parties to do. The statement "At no time has the Defendant 
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questioned either the procedures utilized by the Court or the 
authority of the Court," refers to an acknowledgement by the 
Defendant and counsel that Judge Moffat had the final word when it 
came to deciding whether conflicts would be resolved by evidentiary 
hearing or proffers of testimony. Moreover, this statement is an 
acknowledgement that an evidentiary hearing had been scheduled but 
was canceled and the Court "suggested" an alternative means of 
resolving the issues. To indicate that no objection to the lack 
of an evidentiary hearing was made by the Defendant or his attorney 
is erroneous. Plaintiff and counsel were present in chambers and 
clearly heard a reiterated request for an evidentiary hearing to 
be held on October 17, 1989 and disappointment and objection to 
the fact that no evidentiary hearing could be held unless it was 
scheduled at some date in the future (the inference and 
understanding being that the future date would be quite a while in 
the future), and that the rescheduling of the evidentiary hearing 
would be at significant cost to the Defendant. It is absolutely 
untenable that the Plaintiff and her counsel would misconstrue an 
affidavit filed by counsel in an unrelated matter and attempt to 
relate it back to events that transpired on October 17, 1989. 
The Defendant and Counsel were aware, on October 17, 
1989, that should the decision rendered by Judge Moffat after 
review of the submitted documents could still be contrary to 
paragraph seven (7) of the Decree of Divorce and detrimental to the 
Defendant, and that the Defendant had a right to appeal from the 
final Order. This right to appeal was never waived. Nor was the 
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right to address any issue on appeal ever waived. Moreover, it is 
important to realize that given the exigencies of the situation, 
although objection to the lack of an evidentiary hearing was made, 
the same was not vociferously argued for pragmatic reasons, 
including the lack of time to do so and fear of adverse 
repercussions. 
IV. DEFENDANT DID PERFECT HIS RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
AT THE TRIAL LEVEL AND THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER ANY STATEMENTS 
OR CLAIMS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The Plaintiff and her attorney assert that many of the 
assertions and arguments made by the Defendant in his brief and on 
appeal are not supported by the record. However, these contentions 
are absolutely inaccurate. Each reference made to any 
documentation or arguments advanced by the Defendant at either 
Order to Show Cause hearing or before Judge Moffat are clearly 
referred to and each document referred to is clearly identified. 
Additionally, each document identified by the Defendant in his 
brief has been reproduced and incorporated into the Defendant's 
brief and was submitted either at one of the Order to Show Cause 
hearings or to Judge Moffat on October 17, 1989. 
It is absolutely preposterous for the Plaintiff to 
continue asserting that the Defendant did not list the home for 
sale with Merrill Lynch Realty Relocation. If the Defendant did 
not list the home for sale then the following events would not have 
transpired: 
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1. Leo Tyson would not have been assigned to be the 
relocation coordinator. 
2. Appraisals would not have been done on the home. 
3. Inspections of the home would not have been done. 
4. An offer to purchase the home would not have been 
made. 
5. Negotiations for the sale of the home to Merrill 
Lynch Realty Relocation would not have transpired. 
The only means that the relocation company had to even commence 
negotiations with the parties, much less to eventually offer to 
purchase their home, was triggered by the initial contact by the 
Defendant and the agreement made to list the home with the 
relocation company for purchase. Documentation of the transactions 
between the Defendant and the relocation company are numerous and 
have been submitted to this Court and the trial court. 
Contrary to the assertions made by the Plaintiff, the 
record does establish that the Plaintiff was a co-owner of the 
residence with the Defendant. The documentation to support the 
joint tenancy of the parties are all of the closing documents from 
the parties1 original purchase of the home in 1981, the Deed of 
Trust, and the documents evidencing the parties' financing of the 
home. Likewise, the documents obtained by the Defendant and the 
letters from counsel for the Plaintiff to the representative of the 
relocation company do demonstrate that the Plaintiff had not signed 
any of the documents provided by Merrill Lynch until sometime in 
1990. However, the Defendant also submitted copies of documents 
that were blank which the Plaintiff had been requested to sign. 
19 
All of the aforereferenced documents have been submitted to the 
lower court and are attachments to the Defendant's brief. 
The Defendant did perfect and preserve his record. This 
Court should take notice of the Defendant's arguments, review the 
supporting documentation, and when properly interpreting the same 
order the relief requested by the Defendant in his appeal. 
V. DEFENDANT HAS NOT FAILED TO CITE HIS STATEMENTS OF 
FACTS OR ASSERTIONS TO THE RECORD ON APPEAL AND THE TRIAL COURT'S 
JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE PRESUMED CORRECT. 
Sophie Orvin, Commissioner Peuler's clerk executed an 
affidavit which was filed with the Court Appeals verifying that 
there was no transcribed record or oral record of the second Order 
to Show Cause Proceeding before Commissioner Peuler. It would be 
impossible for the Defendant to make reference to this transcript 
in his reply brief as one cannot refer to a thing which is not in 
existence. However, the Defendant did make reference to his 
arguments and the documents submitted to both Commissioner Peuler 
and Judge Moffat. Each of the arguments are supported by 
documents. The documents are incorporated in the Defendant's brief 
and were submitted at either the Order to Show Cause hearing or the 
hearing held before Judge Moffat on October 17, 1989. Adequate 
reference to the record has been made in Defendant's brief. Any 
allegation antithetical to this is erroneous and specious. 
There is no reason for the Court to affirm the trial 
court's judgement because of the Defendant's alleged failure to 
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support his factual assertions by reference to the record on 
appeal. Conversely, there is ample documentary evidence which 
mandates this Court affirm the relief sought by the Defendant. 
VI. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS AND PLAINTIFF 
SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED ATTORNEYf S FEES, COSTS AND DAMAGES ON APPEAL. 
The Defendant has not ever attempted to delay resolution 
of a proper interpretation of the Decree of Divorce nor has he ever 
purposely been dilatory in any of his actions. Nor has the 
Defendant ever engaged in a frivolous post-litigation action. The 
converse cannot be said of the Plaintiff. Sometime ago counsel for 
the Defendant suggest to counsel for the Plaintiff that all of the 
post-litigation issues pending, either in a modification proceeding 
or the Order to Show Cause proceeding initiated by the Defendant, 
be consolidated for resolution at either a meeting between the 
parties and their counsel or at one evidentiary hearing to be 
scheduled before Judge Moffat. Counsel for the Plaintiff 
categorically rejected these suggestions and made it necessary for 
the Defendant to institute separate post-litigation proceedings. 
As an example of the alleged dilatory tactics of the 
Defendant the Plaintiff and her attorney site the Defendant's 
unwillingness to stipulate to an amendment of the Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order. If the Court will carefully read the 
submission tendered by the Plaintiff at the first Order to Show 
Cause hearing they will note that the Defendant had valid 
objections to allowing an amended Qualified Domestic Relations 
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Order to be entered. He did not object to any correction of a 
typographical error, but he objected to an interpretation as to the 
amounts of money the Plaintiff was entitled to as her participation 
in his retirement plans. The documentation submitted by the 
Defendant shows that the Plaintiff was requesting that she be given 
one half (1/2) of the accumulated book value of his retirement 
plans although there was an outstanding loan taken out by the 
parties against the retirement account and the Decree of Divorce 
stipulated that the Plaintiff was awarded an interest in the cash 
value of the retirement fund. (Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs1 
Order to Show Cause) 
It is correct that there are several post-litigation 
matters pending at the trial court level. However, these actions 
were necessitated because the Stipulation and Decree of Divorce are 
ambiguous and because the Plaintiff and her counsel have refused, 
on numerous occasions, to meet with the Defendant and attempt to 
informally resolve these matters. Additionally, the Defendant can 
document that the Plaintiff received the proceeds from the sale of 
a significant block of stock to which she was not entitled. He is 
attempting to recover the monies wrongfully paid by the stock 
transfer company to the Plaintiff. 
The Defendant has diligently pursued resolution of these 
proceedings. However, as noted in Exhibit "R" of the Plaintiff's 
brief, which is a letter dated February 2, 1990 to Judge Moffat by 
counsel for the Defendant it is noted that Judge Moffat indicated 
he would grant the parties an evidentiary hearing of forty (40) 
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minutes duration on issues raised by the Defendant in his Order to 
Show Cause. Counsel for the Defendant has indicated to Judge 
Moffat and to his clerk that a forty (40) minute evidentiary 
hearing is insufficient to accommodate the anticipated testimony 
and she has requested that this matter be scheduled when more time 
is available. Additionally, the Defendant has been working almost 
simultaneously on projects in California and Massachusetts. He has 
been doing a considerable amount of traveling back and forth 
between the east coast and west coast. Judge Moffat's clerk has 
not notified counsel for the Defendant that there has been a half 
day setting available. Even assuming that a half day setting did 
become available it would be difficult, if not impossible to 
coordinate the same with the Defendant's work assignments. 
This litigation and all of the post-litigations are 
attributable to an extremely ambiguous document drafted by 
Plaintiff and her counsel, overreaching by the Plaintiff, who has 
attempted to be awarded assents and relief to which she clearly is 
not entitled, and the fact that a no longer naive or trusting 
Defendant is now cognizant of his legal rights and is also 
extremely aware of the ongoing complications created by the 
ambiguous Stipulation and Decree of Divorce which must be resolved 
so that this Divorce can be finished. Not only has this appeal and 
the other post-divorce litigations been time consuming and 
expensive for the Defendant, they have also caused him a great deal 
of emotional stress and pain. It was his hope and desire (some of 
which flickers) that after the Divorce he and his estranged wife 
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could remain friends not only because they have children together 
but because he does still care for her. 
This appeal is not frivolous. The only reason that the 
Plaintiff alleges it is frivolous is because she has not received 
the monies she wants and she has not been able to impose her will 
upon the Defendant. The are legitimate and genuine issues of law 
and fact in dispute. The Decree of Divorce is silent as to the 
responsibilities of the parties to pay the monthly mortgage 
payments subsequent to September 30, 1988. The Defendant contends 
that the Decree is silent on this issue because the parties were 
to split the mortgage payments once the alimony payments to the 
Plaintiff began. The Plaintiff contends that the intent of the 
parties was to have the Defendant bear the sole responsibility for 
the ongoing monthly mortgage payments while she continued to ignore 
her contractual obligations with the mortgage holder, and while she 
continued to reap the benefit of the accrued appreciation and 
equity. Only an evidentiary hearing before Judge Moffat or a 
ruling from this Court interpreting paragraph seven (7) of the 
Decree of Divorce will put the issue at rest. Neither Commissioner 
Peuler nor Judge Moffat allowed the Defendant to fully explore this 
issue and seek resolution of the ambiguity. 
Additionally, there is a genuine issue on appeal as to 
whether or not the equity could or should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff prior to the time the parties1 marital home was sold. 
Likewise, there is a genuine issue as to the amount of equity that 
should have been awarded to the Plaintiff if indeed it was proper 
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to award equity to the Plaintiff prior to a sale of the home. 
These are but a few of the issues identified by the Defendant and 
argued on appeal. None of them are frivolous. None of them were 
properly addressed by the lower court. All of them have merit and 
need resolution. This Court should not declare the Defendant's 
appeal frivolous. Nor should it award attorney's fees, costs or 
"damages" to the Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's substantive and procedural rights were 
clearly violated by the lower court. Commissioner Peuler's 
recommendation and the Order entered by Judge Moffat affirming the 
recommendation were violative of the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce, are an impermissible modification and amendment of the 
Decree of Divorce, and cannot be supported either as conforming to 
precedence established in other cases nor good law. The decision 
of the lower court wrongfully penalizes the Defendant for things 
he has been accused of but did not do. Not only is Defendant 
penalized by an erroneous finding that he failed to list the 
parties' marital home for sale, the lower court's decision goes 
further in being punitive as it wrongfully deprives the Defendant 
of monies that he does not owe the Plaintiff. 
Moreover, The Plaintiff's assertion and argument that the 
lower court's decision is properly within the scope of Rule 70 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is patently specious. The 
Defendant was never required to tender to the Plaintiff the stated 
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sum of money within a stated period of time to extinguish her 
equity interest in the home. Rather, the Defendant and the 
Plaintiff were ordered to list the home for sale and to divide the 
net sale proceeds realized when the home was sold to a third party 
bona fide purchaser. Until the home is sold there is no money due 
and owing the Plaintiff. As the Plaintiff is adamant that the home 
be sold then she can be empowered to sell it. Alternatively, she 
can wait for the Defendant to sell the home, which he will do when 
a listing agreement that is satisfactory to the listing agent can 
be executed. Unless and until the proper equity calculation is 
made and/or sales proceeds are actually realized the Defendant 
continues to be penalized and his rights continue to be negated. 
It is absolutely mandated both by the terms of paragraph seven (7) 
of the Decree of Divorce and by controlling case law that this 
matter be remanded for an evidentiary hearing or that this Court 
make a proper determination of the respective rights and 
obligations of the parties. 
Respectfully submitted on this 20th day of August, 1990. 
CarolynJ3riscoll 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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